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Title to Ice-How Acquired.
The lessee of a portion of the shores of a great pond, who, without
scraping the snow from the ice thereon, erects stakes, with his name upon
them, around nearly one-half the pond, does not thereby acquire such a
right to the ice thus enclosed as will enable him to maintain trover
against an ice company which, previous to the formation of the ice, had
removed the lily pads from the surface of the pond, and afterward
scraped off the stqow, bored holes in the ice to let off the surface water,
and proceeded to harvest the ice against the written protestation of the
plaintiff..
ICE, AND PROPERTY THRErw.

(I) ITS NATURE.-As ice is merely
frozen water, formed over the land,
and so included in its indefinite
extent upward, it would at first
blush seem to be of the nature of
realty; and it has accordingly been
compared to alluvion, accretion or
accession, and held to be the property of the owner of the subjacent
soil, and not open to seizure and
occupancy. State v:, Pottmeyer,
33 Ind., 402; S. C., 5 Am. Rep.,
224; Edgerton v. Huff, 26 Ind., 35;
Paine 'v. Wobds, ro8"Mass.,- i6o.
"Ice, from its general use, has
come to be a merchantable commodity of value, and the traffic in
it a quite important business. It
would not be in the interest of peace
and good order, nor consistent with
legal policy, that such an article
should be held a thing of common
right, and be left the subject ofgen-

eral scramble, leading to acts of
force and violence." Washington
Ice Co. v. Shortall, ioi Ill., 46;
S. C., 38 Am. Rep., 255, note. But,
on the other hand, the separate and
distinct nature and properties of ice,
its lack of permanence, the very
precarious character of its connection with the soil, and the fact of
its being so frequently severed and
made an article of extensive trade,
would seem to indicate the propriety
of regarding it, for some purposes,
at least, as personalty; and it has
been held that a sale of ice already
formed, whether in or out of the
water at the time, is a sale of personalty, and not within the Statute
of Frauds. "The ephemeral character of ice renders it incapable of
any permanent or beneficial use as
part of the soil, and it is only valuable when removed from its original

1 Reported in 24 AtI. Rep., 802; 84 Me., 155.
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place. Its connection-if its position in the water can be called a
connection-is neither organic nor
lasting. Its removal or disappearance can take nothing from the
land. It can only be used and sold
as personalty, and its only use tends
to its immediate destruction. We
think that it should be dealt with
in law according to its uses in fact,
and that any sale of ice ready
formed, as a distinct commodity,
should be held a sale of personalty,
whether in the water or out of the
water." Higgins v. Kusterer, 41
Mich., 3 T8 ; S. C., 2N.W. Rep., 13;
32 Am. Rep., i6o. But this same
result could be as easily reached by
holding, on the basis of the reasoning above, that a sale of ice was a
sale of personalty, not because of
its nature, but because of the fact
that such a contract, necessarily
contemplates its severance, thus
putting it on the same footing as a
sale of standing timber. This would
be equally consonant with principle, and would avoid the anomaly
of treating the subject-matter as
invested with two differing niatures.
It is far better, then, to regard ice
as of the same legal, as it is in fact
of the same physical nature as
water, and treat it as realty until
severed. Then, of course, it becomes personalty, and may be the
subject of larceny. Ward v. Peo.,
6 Hill (N. Y.), 144.
(2) WHO RNTITLED TO ITS POSSESSION.
(a) In Unnavigable Waters. As the title to water covering land is
generally in the owner of the land
that underlies it, Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns., Ch. 162; Goddard v.
Dakin, iolMetc. (Mass.), 94; DeWitt
Harvey, 4 Gray (Mass.), 486; so,
also, the title to the ice that forms

thereon is in the owner of the underlying soil, as has been stated
above. "The just and reasonable
use of the water which belongs to
the riparian proprietor, in case of its
being congealed into ice, would give
him the unlimited use and appropriation of the ice as his exclusive
property:
Vashington Ice Co. z'.
Shortall, IOI Ill, 46. His right in
the water may be compared to that
of the owner of land adjoining a
public road or street: Brookville
and Metamora Hydraulic Co. v.
Butler, 9r Ind., 134; S. C., 46 Am.
Rep., 581. His interest in the ice,
however, differs somewhat from
that which he has in the water.
As the latter is of an unstable,
transitory nature, his rights therein
can only exist while it is within
the limits of his domain, and cease
of necessity as soon as it passes beyond them; and, further, by the
operation of the old maxim, "'qua
currit,et debet currere, ut currere
solebat," he has only a right to the
use of it as distinguished from an
absolute property therein. Ice,
however, is not, at least while cold
weather lasts, of a transitory nature, but is reasonably fixed and
permanent-quite as much so as
the soil that forms the banks of the
stream-and may, therefore, well
be considered capable of absolute
ownership. This has been doubted
in one case only: Marshall v.
Peters, 12 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 218,
where Judge E-NIOTT held that the
owner of a mill-dam and one-half
of the soil underlying it had no
such absolute right to the ice overlying his land that his licensee
could bring suit for an injunction
to restrain another from cutting
and carrying off the ice from that
portion of the pond. But this is
opposed to the weight of authority;
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and the doctrine that the ice belongs absolutely to the owner of
the soil beneath it is now settled
beyond controversy. It makes no
difference whether the ice be
formed in a pond or a running
stream; whether his title extends
from bank to bank, t6 the thread of
a stream, or to only a limited portion of the area of a pond, in any
case his title to the ice is commensurate with his ownership of
the underlying land, and he can
prevent its removal; or, if another
removes it without license the latter will be guilty of a trespass:
State v. Pottmeyer, 33 Ind., 402; S.
C., 15 Am. Rep., 224; Clute v.
Fisher, 65 Mich,, 48; Bigelow v.
Shaw, 65 Mich., 241; Washington
Ice Co. v. Shortall, ioi Ill., 46;
S. C., 38 Am. Rep., 255, note; 12
Am. LAw REG., 313.

So, when a

street of an incorporated village,
situated upon the bank of a river,
extends to the thread of the stream,
and the fee of the street is in the
corporation for the benefit of the
lot-owners and the public, the
village authorities may properly
interpose to prevent an intruder
from cutting and removing ice
which may have formed upon the
water overlying the course of the
street: Brooklyn v. Smith, 104 Ill.,
429; S. C., 44 Am. Rep., 90.
A
lesser of a river front has the right
to have it free from obstruction in
order that he may gather ice
thereon, and may maintain an action against one who has erected a
boom in front of the leased premises under a parol license from the
grantor of the lease: Lorman v.
Benson, 8 Mich., 18; and a lessee
of riparian rights, having thereby
acquired the right to enclose and
store ice for his own use and profit,
within the limits embraced in his

leasee, provided that he does not interfere with the right of navigation
or the proper use of the stream by
other people, may recover from the
owners of a steamboat that was run
back and forth unnecessarily near
his field of ice, thereby destroying
it: People's Ice Co. v. Steamer
"Excelsior," 44 Mich., 229; S. C.,
6 N. XV. Rep., 636.
The title of the owner of the underlying soil remains the same,
whether the water upon which the
ice forms is in the natural bed of a
stream or is backed upon his lands
by the erection of a dam. In the
latter case, all that the owner of
the dam or mill privilege possesses
is the right of flowage and the right
to have a sufficient supply of water.
He can lay no claim to the ice that
is formed upon the surface of the
water so long as he is not the
owner of the soil beneath; but the
title to the ice vests absolutely in
the owner of that soil, and he can
cut and remove it, subject only to
the limitation that he may not, by
so doing, interfere with the rights
of the owner of the dam or mill
privilege: Cummings v. Barrett, io
Cush. (Mass. ', 186; Dodge v. Berry,
26 Hun. (N. Y.), 246; Brookville
and Metamora Hydraulic Co. v.
Butler, 91 Ind., 134; S. C., 46 Am.
Rep., 581; Julien v. Woodsmall, 82
Ind., 568. "The ice forming upon
the waters of the stream where it
ran through the plaintiffs premises,
without any overflow by the dam,
would belong to her by reason of
her proprietorship of the soil, although the waters of such creek
could not be directed by her to the
injury of the owners of the stream
below her. Upon the same principle the ownership of the soil beneath the overflow would endow
her with exclusive property in the
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ice upon such overflow:" Bigelow
v. Shaw, 65 Mich., 341. A contrary doctrine was held in Myer v.
Whitaker, 55 How. Pr. (N. Y.,
376; S. C., 5 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.),
172; but there the learned Judge,
in his reaction against the erroneous ruling in Marshall v.
Peters, 12 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 218,
suffered his eyes to be blinded to
the fact that the facts of his case
were different from those of the
latter, and by following out a chain
of reasoning adapted to that arrived at a result which would there
have been correct but was wrong
in the case before him. His decision, however, has been uniformly disregarded, and carries no
authority.
A yet more curious perversion of
reasoning appeared in Mill River
Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 34 Conn., 462,
where the Court argued that the
owner of the soil could not cut and
remove the ice from a mill-dam,
because, ice being frozen water, the
volume of water in the dam might
be materially lessened by so doing,
and so an injury might be done .to
the mill owner. The fallacy of this
was neatly exposed in Brookville
and Metamora Hydraulic Co. v.
Butler, supra, where the Court
said: "This seems to us a narrow
view, and one not in harmony with
authority or consistent with sound
principle. It may possibly be that
if the evidence in a particular case
shall show a diminution of the supply of water the land owner might
then be prevented from taking ice;
this, however, affords no ground
for a broad general rule; the Court
has as little ground for presuiing
that taking the ice would diminish
the supply of water as for presuming that allowing a dozen, or a half
dozen horses to drink from the

pond would appreciably injure
the owner of the easement:"1 see
Dodge v. Berry, 26 Hun. (N. Y.),
246; and was successfully refuted in
Cummings v. Barrett, io Cush.
(Mass.), r86, as follows: "Ice must
be cut in winter. It usually melts
in the latter part of winter, or early
part of spring, together with the
ice and snow of the surrounding
country; and these, together with
the rains which cause and promote
them, constitute what is usually
called the spring flood, which commonly causes a great surplus of
water in similar mill streams, not
only not available to any useful
purpose to mills but often injurious. And it may well be doubted,
after any quantity of ice cut from
such a pond, whether after the
spring floods have subsided, and
the useless surplus of water passed
away, and long before the approach
of any 'dry season.' the water in
the pond would not be as full and
copious for all mill purposes as if
no ice had been so cut."
This
weight of authority and reason may
be considered as settling the question; and not only has the owner
of a mill-dam no right to the ice
thereon unless he owns the soil
under it, but the owner of the soil
overflowed may cut and dispose of
it, so long as no manifest injury is
cahsed to the mill owner by his so
doing. The land owner's right is so
well settled that if the mill owner
unnecessarily and maliciously draws
off the water and so spoils the ice
he will be liable in damages: Stevens v. Kelly, 78 Me., 445; S. C.,
6 Atl. Rep., 868; 57 Am. Rep., 813.
The owner may also recover if the
ice is spoiled or damaged in any
other way: See Finger z'. City of
Kingston, 9 N. Y.Suppl., 175.
(b)In .Vavigable Waters.-The
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old English rule that the fee of the
bed of tidal streams is in the sovereign, forms a part of the common
law of this country; and, of course,
the ice in such streams cannot belong to the riparian proprietor by
virtue of his ownership of the soil.
In regard to non-tidal streams,
however, there is a conflict of decision. There are many navigable
streams in the United States, far
above tide-water, over which it is
of the highest importance that the
government should retain control;
and, further, English non-tidal
streams, which are insignificant and
usually non-navigable, ought not
to furnish a criterion for our inland
rivers, such as the M issouri, Ohio,
Tennessee and Arkansas. Cessante
ratione, cessat el ifisa lex. This is
in fact the doctrine approved by
the courts of the United States:
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S., 324,
and of some of the States: Woodman z. Pitman, 79 Me., 456; S. C:,
ioAtl. Rep., 321. In Pennsylvania
the question does not depend either
upon tidal character or actual navigability of the stream: and where
land is bounded by any of the large
rivers, the title to beyond and low
water mark remains in the Commonwealth: Carson z Blayer, 2
lBinn., 475: Shrunk v. l',av. Co., 14
S. & R., I; Johns v. Davidson,
4 Hains, 522 (where the difference
between Pennsylvania and New
York in that respect is referred
to).
Even when a stream is
non-navigable the meandering of
its shores by the government
retains the title when the adjacent lands are disposed of; and
the riparian proprietors have
no title to its bed and consequently no exclusive title to the
ice formed over it: Brown v. Cunningham (Iowa), 48 N. W. Rep.,

2042. But in other States, even
where the stream has been meandered, the common law rule a3 to
tidal waters is retained in all its
strictness and narrowness to avoid
the disturbance of settled rights of
property: Clute v. Fisher, 65 Mich.,
48; Chicago v. Laflin, 49 Ill., 172;
Chicago v. McGuin, 51 Ill., 266;
Braxon v. Bressler, 64 Il1., 488. In
Illinois the title of the riparian
proprietor is held to extend to the
centre thread of even the Mississippi: Middleton v. Pritchard, 3
Scam., 510; Houck v. Yates, 82
Ill., 179; Washington Ice Co. v.
Shortall, IO Ill., 46. Wherever
the old rule prevails the principles
stated above in regard to non-navigable waters apply to all but tidal
streams, and the title of the riparian
proprietor includes the ice.
But where the riparian proprietor
has no title to the bed of the stream,
that being vested in the government, the ice that forms over it is
like a derelict, or an animal fera
nature,aud becomes the property
of the one who first appropriates it:
Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kans., 682;
S. C., 40 Am. Rep., 330. It is, of
course, impossible to exactly define the acts which will constitute
an appropriation sufficient to give
title, but it seems to be enough if
labor and money have been expended upon the preparation of the
ice for cutting, and the intention
to appropriate it be clearly shown.
It is not essential that it be actually
cut. '"Any citizen who may lawfully go upon the stream may
gather ice from it under the regulations prescribed by law. He is entitled to the ice he prepares by his
labor to be removed. It is plain
that if he cuts ice for transportation
to his ice-house another cannot
rob him of his labor by carrying
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away his ice; and it is plain that
when he makes preparations to use
the ice upon a certain part of the
stream, prepares its surface for cutting, erects machinery to handle
the ice, makes walks or ways for
workmen, or in any other proper
manner indicates the part of the
stream which he occupies in his
operations, which must be reasonable in extent and in all other respects, he has a property right to
the occupation of such locality
during the ice season and to the
ice formed there :" Brown v. Cunninghain (Iowa), 48 N. W. Rep.,
1042.
It will be seen from this
that the right of occupation is not
an unlimited one, at least until
perfected by actual seizure, but
must be exercised with due regard
for others. In other words, it is
highly probable that the courts
would refuse to sanction a claim to
title by occupancy to the whole of
the ice on a stream by merely preparing it for cutting; but if it were
once actually cut and housed, it is
difficult to see how they could impugn the title of its possessor.
One who has thus appropriated
a field of ice upon a navigable
river, by surveying, marking and
staking it off, and expending
money to preserve it and make it
valuable commercially, has a sufficient possession to support an action for trespass against one who
cuts it and carries it away with
force and threats, the only limitation upon the right of occupancy
being that it must not interfere with
the paramount right of the public
to free navigation: Hickey v.
In
Hazard, 3 Mo. App., 480.
Maine, however, where the rivers
are totally closed to navigation
during the winter, and the ice upon
them is then used as a public thor-

oughfare, while the right of the
public to so use them is recognized, and any one who cuts holes
in the ice near a customary winter
way is liable to a traveler injured
thereby, without fault on his part:
French v. Camp, 18 Me., 433, yet,
in view of the importance of the
ice traffic, it is held that the right
of passage in a place like the Penobscot at Bangor, where the great
body of the ice is annually taken
from the water, is relative only,
and to be exercised reasonably; and
that a traveler cannot recover if he
had a clear opportunity to avoid
the accident, even though the ice
field was left unprotected: Woodman v. Pitman, 79 Me., 456; S. C.,
ro Atl. Rep., 321.
The right of the riparian owner
to take the ice which .forms upon
artificial waterways, such as canals,
depends entirely upon the nature
of the estate taken by the State and
its grantees in the land upon which
the same is constructed. If that
estate be a mere easement, then,
just as in the case of flowage by
the erection of a dam, the ice belongs to the owner of the fee; but
if the estate taken be a fee, the
former owner has no remaining interesttherein, and the ice is exclusively the property of the company
that owns or leases the franchises
of the canal: Water Works Co. of
Indianapolis v. Burkhart, 4r Ind.,
364; Cromie v. Board of Trustees of
Wabash and Erie Canal, 71 Ind.,
208. This, however, is strictly limited to the land necessarily taken
for the bed and basins of the canal,
and when, as an incident of its
construction, a large pond is formed
upon lowlands adjoining the canal
used only for the purpose of overflow, the ice formed thereon is the
property of the owner of the sub-
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jacent soil, and he m'ay cut and remove it, subject only to the conditions that no injury shall be done
to the easement of the canal company, and that the flow of water
shall not be materially lessened:
Brookville & Metamora Hydraulic
Co. v. Butler, 91 Ind., 134; S. C,
46 Am. Rep., 58i. But, as has been
shown above, this latter condition
practically imposes no limitation
upon the right of removing the
ice, and the title of the owner in
such a case may be considered absolute.
(c) In "Great Ponds."-This is
a branch of the subject peculiar to
the States of Maine and Massachusetts, where, by the colonial ordinance of 1641-7, the soil of great
ponds-that is, ponds of more than
ten acres in extent-is held by the
State for the public, and, therefore,
the rights of fishing, bathing and
boating therein, and of taking ice
therefrom, are common to all who
can lawfully obtain access thereto,
no one being able, by occupancy or
otherwise, to obtain an exclusive
right therein, except by grant of
the legislature, or by prescription,
which supposes a grant: Cummings
v. Barrett, io Cush. (Mass.), 186.
The title of the. riparian owners
only extends to low-water mark,
and they have no greater rights in
the pond itself than any other person has who can reach it without
trespassing on the land of others,
and it makes no difference in this
regard whether the riparian owner
be an individual or a company
charterel for the express purpose
of dealing in ice: West Roxbury
v. Stoddard, 7 Allen (Mass.), i58;
Brastow v. Rockport Ice Co., 77
Me., ioo; Hittinger z Eames, 121
Mass., 539; Gage v. Steinkraus,
131 Mass., 222; Rowell v. Doyle,

131 Mass., 474. The right being
common to all, however, must be
exercised by each one reasonably,
and must not be so used as not to
interfere with the rights of others:
Paine v. Woods, io8 Mass., 16o.
An exclusive right to cut ice from
such a pond cannot be established
by an agreement made by the
riparian proprietors defining the
respective portions of the ice which
they are entitled to cut; and the gran.
tee of a reservation to cut the ice
from the grantor's portion cannot
prevent a grantee of the land affected by the reservation from cutting it, although he had notice
of the reservation: Hittinger v.
Eames, 121 Mass., 539. Nor can a
right to cut ice against all the land
owned by the grantor and bordering on the pond be conveyed by an
owner who has acquired no exclusive right against the public, so
as to bind a subsequent grantee of
the land, and prevent him from
cutting ice thereon; for the covenants do not run with the land:
Gage v. Steinkraus, 131 Mass.,
222.

A title by occupancy to the ice
on such a pond can be gained only
by actual taking; a constructive
possession cannot be gained by
merely scraping off the snow and
marking out the limits within
which the occupier intends to cut,
and then leaving it to thicken; and
if another, who has the right to
fish on the pond, cuts holes for
that purpose in the ice the former
has no remedy against him (unless,
perhaps, he can prove that the act
was malicious); for he has no right,
to the exclusion of other public
uses, to the occupation of any part
of the pond, for the purpose, by
artificial means, of increasing the
thickness of the ice: Rowell ve

ICE, AND PROPERTY THEREIN.
Doyle, 131 Mass., 474. Still less
can such a title be acquired by
merely staking off the ice without
scraping it, as against one who has
taken pains to prepare the ice for
cutting: Barrett v. Itockport Ice
Co. (the principal case), (Me.); 24
AtI. Rep., 802; S. C., 84 Me., 155.
"The case is not like one of capturing animals fere naturev, or of
taking possession of derelict property. It is more analogous to the
case of a tenant in common attempting to take possession of a
part of the common estate by
staking it off and thus excluding
his co-tenants:" People's Ice Co.
7P.Davenport, 149 Mass., 322; S.
C., 21 At. Rep., 385.
There is here, as stated in the
principal case, a serious conflict
with some of the decisions in other
States as to what will constitute
appropriation. But this conflict is
more apparent than real. It seems
to have escaped the attention of
the Court that the case of these
great ponds is wholly different
from that of other public waters,
and, therefore, cannot justly be
compared with them. In the latter
instance no individual has any
title until after occupancy by him,
and all that is necessary to establish his title is, as in the case of
public lands or mining claims, as
noticed in Brown v. Cunningham,
supra,to notify the world at large
of his intention; and that is very
effectually done by staking off the
part he claims. But in the case of
a great pond the individual has a
title, inchoate, it is true, and perfected only by actual seizure; but,
nevertheless, a subsisting title, one
strong enough to support a bill in
equity against one who interferes
with its beneficial enjoyment:
Tudor v. Cambridge Water Works,

I Allen (Mass.), x64; and, therefore, not to be defeated by a mere
constructive possession. As was
said in People's Ice Co. v. Davenport, 149 Mass., 322; S. C., 21 AtI.
Rep., 385, the public are tenants in
common of the various incorporeal
hereditaments arising in such
ponds, which, nevertheless, are not
strictly commons, for, if wholly
surrounded, only the riparian proprietors would seem to have any
rights therein. This being the
case, it will be readily apparent
that only actual possession can
confer a paramount title as against
the rights of others.
As to the exact nature of the
right to the privileges of such
ponds, and the vesting of the fee,
there seems to be no precise adjudication; but it would seem plausible
to hold that the fee was in the State
or town as trustee for the inhabitants. This, however, is still an
open question.
Where, as in Illinois, Card v.
McCaleb, 69 Ill., 314, a right is
given by statute to all persons
resident along the line of a canal
to cut and remove ice from the
same, its feeders, side-cuts and
basins, free of charge, it would
seem very similar to that of cutting
ice in a "great pond," and would
presumably be governed by the
same rules.
(3)

CONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY

IN ICE.
The right to cut ice may be conveyed by deed or by parol license;
but in the latter case no title to the
ice will pass unless it be executed:
Balcom v. McQuestien (N. H.), 17
At. Rep., 638. When conveyed by
deed, however, it is more than a
mere revocable license, and the
grantee has a valuable right, for an
encroachment upon which the law
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will give him a remedy: Richards v.
Gauffret, 145 Mass., 486. Such a
conveyance, when joined with a
conveyance of adjacent land, may
create an easement appurtenant to
the land: Huntington v. Asher, 96
N. Y., 6o4, reversing S. C., 26 Hun.
(N. Y.), 496. But the right to take
ice, as has been seen, does not pass
with a grant of a mill-dam or flowage privilege: Dyer v. Curtis, 72
Me., I8i. Nor can an ice company
acquire an easement in the water
through which it tows its ice from
the cutting-ground to the ice-house,
so as to prevent a grantee of the
subjacent land from obstructing it:
Knickerbocker Ico Co. v. State, 41
Hun. (N. Y.), 458.
When premises, used for hotel
purposes, upon which was situated
a partly filled ice-house, were sold,
nothing being'said about the icehouse during the negotiations nor
in the deed, nor when possession
was given to the vendee, and no
reservation was made by the vendor
of .a right to enter upon the premises and use or remove the ice, the
ice is to be regarded as a fixture,
intended by the parties to be enjoyed with the realty, and constructively annexed thereto, on the
ground that it is almost indispensable to the full use and enjoyment
:f the premises, and it passes to the
vendee as a part of the freehold:
Hill v. Munday (Ky.), II S. IN.
.ep., 956.

(4) DAMAGES FOR INJURING.
The value of the land for ice
purposes may be considered as an
element of damage when it is taken
under the right of eminent domain:
Ham v. Salem, ioo Mass., 350;
Hyde Park v. Washington Ice Co.,
117 Ill., 233; and also as an offset to
damages claimed for flowing it:
Paine v. Woods, io8 Mass., i6o.
If ice accumulates in a pond
as the consequence of the erection
of a mill-dam, and water is thereby
thrown back upon an existing mill
to its material injury, the owner of
the dam becomes liable for the
damnage done: Davis v. Fuller, 12
Vt., 178; Cowles v. Kidder, 24 N.
H., 364; unless the injury was due
to the intervention of casual and
extraordinary forces, over which
the owner of the dam had no control, and which he could not reasonably foresee: Smith v. Agawam
Canal Co., 2 Allen (Mass'), 355.
NOTR.
Cutting natural ice from the
surface of a pond. or stream and
storing the same in a building is
not a manufacture, and a company
formed for that purpose is not a
manufacturing corporation: Hittinger v. Westport, 135 Mass, 258;
Peo. v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 99
N. Y., 181. Contra: Att.-Gen. v.
Lorman, 59 Mich., 157.
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